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 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY Vol. 16, No. 2, June 1975
 ? 1975 by The Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research
 A Demographer's View of Prehistoric
 Demography
 by William Petersen
 INCREASINGLY DURING the past decade or two, archeologists,
 prehistorians, anthropologists, and practitioners of related
 disciplines have grappled with the problems involved in
 deducing population statistics from various types of merely
 indicative data. The results have seldom been satisfactory
 even to the authors themselves. The comment in a recent
 archeology text (Hole and Heizer 1969:306) seems to be
 typical of the current mood:
 Probably few kinds of archeological interpretation have more
 systematically built-in sources of potential error than have estimates
 of population, yet such figures are commonly given and used
 for making further inferences. It is safe to say that, because our
 concert:s in archeology turn more and more toward reconstructing
 social systems, we shall have to devise methods of obtaining better
 demographic data.
 The way to proceed, I suggest, may be to make fuller
 use of some of the techniques that demographers have
 devised to analyze populations in other contexts.
 1 The content of this paper was first presented as several lectures
 in an experimental interdisciplinary course, cross-listed in anthro-
 pology and geology-mineralogy, organized by Ernest G. Ehlers
 at Ohio State University. Its purpose was to present techniques
 derived from several disciplines that are useful in classifying and
 interpreting archeological data. In preparing the article, I received
 welcome guidance from colleagues at Ohio State University: Emilio
 Casetti in the Geography Department and William M. Sumner,
 Peter W. Post, Frank E. Poirier, Erika Bourguignon, Lynn Ager,
 James E. Collington, and James Ryder in the Anthropology
 Department.
 W1LL1AM PETERSEN is Robert Lazarus Professor of Social Demog-
 raphy at Ohio State University (Columbus, Ohio 43210, U.S.A.).
 Born in 1912, he was educated at Columbia University (B.A.,
 1934; Ph.D., 1954). He has taught at Smith College, the
 University of Colorado, Boston College, and the University
 of California at Berkeley. His research interests are generally
 in areas that overlap demography and sociology; he is now
 studying the relations between Flemings and Walloons in
 Belgium on a Ford Foundation grant. His publications include
 12 books, among them Planned Migration (Berkeley: University
 of California Press, 1955), Population (New York: Macmillan,
 1961, 1969), The Politics of Population (Garden City: Doubleday,
 1964, 1970), and Japanese Americans (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter
 Smith, 1971). Some of his articles are "Keynes's Theories of
 Population and the Concept of 'Optimum"' (Population Studies
 8:228-46), "A General Typology of Migration" (American Socio-
 logical Review 23:256-66), "The Demographic Transition in
 the Netherlands" (American Sociological Review 25:334-37), and
 "Religious Statistics in the United States" (Journalfor the Scientific
 Study of Religion 1).
 The present article, submitted in final form 27 iv 74, was
 sent for comment to 50 scholars. The responses are printed
 after the text and are followed by a reply by the author.
 That most of those who write on prehistoric demography
 show little or no acquaintance with the writings of profes-
 sional demographers is based, one would suppose, on a
 fundamental misunderstanding: the notion that demogra-
 phy is concerned almost entirely with the analysis of the
 hard data gathered through modern censuses and vital
 statistics. Several misconceptions are included in this ap-
 praisal. In the first place, no nation has ever made a
 complete and accurate count of its inhabitants and their
 characteristics, so that even in the best cases what is
 eventually published invariably includes emendations by
 the central statistical office. The demographic data of most
 of the world, moreover, are full of holes and often quite
 unreliable. One of the most important practical applications
 of formal demography, thus, has become "demographic
 estimation for developing societies," the title of a first-rate
 text (Carrier and Hobcraft 1971).
 Even more pertinent in this context is the momentous
 change over the past several decades in historical demogra-
 phy. A historian's analysis of population data does not
 differ essentially from any of his other efforts: given a
 range of estimates derived from competing sources, he
 uses his detailed knowledge of the whole social context
 to judge which is most likely to be correct. That a scrupulous
 Quellenkritik, as Ranke termed it, is necessary also when
 history is crossed with ethnography is exemplified by the
 records of Central Polynesian populations examined by
 Schmitt (1972); one after another, the experts have shown
 themselves unable to copy figures correctly, to date them
 precisely, and/or to ascribe them to the right territory.
 But even if the estimates of Captain Cook and the other
 Pacific explorers had been copied exactly from the original
 reports, they would have given no more than the slightest
 hint of the actuality. Apart from the fact that he usually
 has a greater and more varied mass of data to work with,
 the historian writing on any period but the most modern
 is hardly better off than the archeologist in trying to derive
 population estimates. The historian does have written
 sources as well as bones and sherds, but to reconstruct
 the link between any of them and past numbers is not
 easy. With respect to demographic analysis, the most
 fundamental break came not with the advent of writing,
 but with the systematic accumulation of population statistics
 gathered for their own sake rather than as the more or
 less incidental by-products of taxation, conscription, or
 other activities involving masses of people.
 Population differs from other topics of historical or
 ethnographic analysis in that it is to some degree a self-con-
 tained process, invariant irrespective of the cultural context.
 Since any person aged 25, if he survives one year, will
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 be 26 years old, a series of reported ages can always be
 checked for internal consistency (Zelnik 1961, 1964; Coale
 and Zelnik 1963). Since the population of any area is equal
 to that population at an earlier data plus the intervening
 natural growth (difference between births and deaths) and
 the net migration (difference between immigration and
 emigration), if some of these elements are known the others
 can be derived or estimated. This equation,
 Pi = P0 + (B-D) + (I-E),
 simple as it is, has been one of the most useful in practical
 demography. Since in any society infants and the elderly
 are more likely to die within a year than adolescents and
 young adults, and since childbearing is physiologically
 limited to females in the same favored age range, there
 is a necessary relation among mortality, fertility, and the
 age structure. As A. J. Lotka pointed out as early as 1907,
 these three elements of any population are associated by
 the following equation (cf. Coale and Demeny 1966:9-10):
 c(a) = be-a p(a)
 where c(a) is the proportion of the population at age a,
 b is the birth rate, e is the base of natural logarithms,
 r is the annual rate of increase, and p (a) is the proportion
 surviving from birth to age a. In other words, if two of
 the three factors are known with a given degree of certainty,
 the range of the third can be stipulated.
 Mathematics of even this modest difficulty is beyond
 the ken of most traditional historians, and the revolution
 in the field occurred when men well trained in such
 techniques applied them to historical data. The pioneer,
 it seems fair to say, was Louis Henry, whose analyses led
 to the authorship of a manual of historical demography
 (Henry 1970) as well as participation in the recently founded
 Soci6t6 de D6mographie Historique and its own Annales.
 The French school has been only somewhat more produc-
 tive than its counterparts in Britain (e.g., Hollingsworth
 1969, Wrigley 1966), the Netherlands (cf. Petersen 1960),
 Germany (e.g., M6nkemeyer 1966, Maier 1972), Italy (e.g.,
 Santini 1972), and Hungary. In each of these countries,
 the work of historians writing about population in the
 framework of a Quellenkritik is being supplemented by
 analyses based on the physiological patterns of demographic
 factors. No one supposes that the historical expertise is
 dispensable, but few any longer doubt the superiority of
 the joint product.
 One of the few comparable analyses of ethnographic
 data is the monograph of Weiss (1973). However welcome
 efforts are to bridge the gap between demography and
 related disciplines, one must note that Weiss's contribution
 shows the typical faults of a pioneer. In a paper addressed
 to an audience generally poorly versed in mathematics,
 he uses an unnecessarily cumbrous notation. More impor-
 tant, he displays an ignorance of fundamentals (or, at best,
 a carelessness in presenting them) that contrasts sharply
 with his technical pretentiousness.2 Weiss's work differs
 2 A few examples must suffice. The crude death rate, conven-
 tionally defined as the number of deaths during a year per thousand
 persons in the population, he defines as the "number of deaths
 per person per year" (indeed, where one places the decimal point
 makes no difference, except in order to avoid this kind of
 physiological nonsense). He offers a unique definition of the
 age-specific birth rate. In his definition of the "average family
 size" (usually called the completed family size), he uses "menarche"
 to designate menopause. "The theory of stable populations," he
 writes, "requires that a population is infinite in size, has no net
 immigration or outmigration, and has fixed rates of fertility and
 mortality at each age." Here he makes a basic error (the population
 is of course not infinite), emends in a confusing way the usual
 from the norm in archeology and anthropology mainly
 in that it makes some genuine effort to assimilate the
 elements of demography.
 In spite of the growing interest in population, in other
 words, very little of the demographic analysis in these
 disciplines has reached the level of professional competence
 that is now almost routine in historical studies. Of course,
 it may be that the data base, particularly in archeology,
 will prove to be too slight to permit one to use these
 techniques, and I do not presume to prejudge the point.
 The purpose of this paper is only to pose the question:
 would not prehistoric demography be improved by a
 systematic cooperation between those now working in the
 subdiscipline and demographers, who to date have done
 little or no work in it?
 EXTENSIONS FROM ARCHEOLOGICAL DATA
 The paucity of archeological data impedes much more than
 demographic analysis. Of itself, the base of hard facts is
 generally too slight to substantiate any but the most elemen-
 tary conclusions, typically of little theoretical import. Much
 of archeological lore, thus, depends on the extrapolations
 suggested by a number of models, either explicit or implicit.
 Two of these models, ethnographic analogy and the
 population-resources balance, are implicit in almost every
 assertion concerning population trends, and it makes sense
 to comment on them before discussing their applications
 to demography per se.
 ETHNOGRAPHIC ANALOGY
 The succession of culture stages the 19th-century theorists
 postulated, with living peoples interpreted as "fossils" of
 types that had elsewhere disappeared, has few defenders
 today. In a modern work it is rare to find such a statement
 as the following (J. Desmond Clark 1962:1):
 Black Africa is rich in ethnographic survivals in micro-environ-
 ments that emphasize the very gradual and conservative nature
 of cultural progress in the subcontinent prior to the coming of
 Western civilization. It is both permissible and illuminating, there-
 fore, to make critical comparisons between later prehistoric cultural
 assemblages in similar environments and the way of life and
 material culture of existing, or recently existing, groups living
 at a similar cultural level.
 If this is taken as the more permissive extreme of a
 continuum, the opposite end can be represented by a
 stricture against the very concept of "survival" (J. Grahame
 D. Clark 1965:171-72):
 Modern savages have a history precisely as long as that of the
 most civilized peoples, even if it does not happen to have been
 written down. . Existing peoples can only be used as sources
 stipulation that there is no migration in either direction (rather
 than no net migration, which would have to include a specification
 concerning the ages, fertility, and mortality of the migrants), and
 shows an unfamiliarity with standard terminology (immigration
 and emigration refer to international movements and in-migration
 and out-migration to movements within a country's borders, but
 a combination of the two refers to nothing). In another paper
 (Weiss 1972), he offers a presumably new measure of "human
 population growth regulation" (he means population growth, for
 not all elements of fertility and mortality are subject to conscious,
 effective control). The net reproduction rate (which he misdefines)
 measures the increase in the number of females over one generation
 on the assumption that age-specific birth and death rates remain
 constant. His innovation, which he terms the "index of growth
 regulation," is the same measure on an annual basis, or what
 demographers call the true or intrinsic rate of natural increase. It
 was first used by Lotka about a half-century ago.
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 for reconstructing the lives of prehistoric peoples with extreme
 caution and within well defined limits, since one is otherwise in
 danger of assuming what one is after all trying to discover.
 In his delimitation of the range of permissible interpreta-
 tion, Hawkes (1954:161) holds that it is "relatively easy"
 to infer from archeological artifacts the techniques that
 were used and, thus, "fairly easy" to infer the subsistence-
 economics of the human groups concerned. Grahame Clark
 (1965:181-82), on the other hand, warns against the facile
 association of an arrowhead, say, with the weapon of a
 contemporary primitive: "one has only to observe the
 immense range of variation in the mounting of closely
 similar forms and, on the other hand, in the types of head
 used for the same purpose to appreciate the dangers of
 this procedure."
 In short, there is a wide range of authoritative counsel,
 and the canon, "Seek analogies in cultures which manipulate
 similar environments in similar ways" (Ascher 1961:319),
 is useful merely in eliminating the clearly inappropriate.
 In such an early classic as Hooton's monograph on the
 Pecos Pueblo (1930:chap. 11), for example, the mortality
 of the reconstructed population was compared with that
 of France in 1866-77 and India in 1901-10, because the
 age structures seemed to correspond. Even at that date,
 a demographer could have pointed out the crucial dif-
 ferences between the populations of a European people,
 the portion of an Asian one represented in the statistics,
 and an Indian tribe. -
 Ethnographic analogy has ordinarily been understood
 narrowly, as the inference from certain specific similarities
 in artifacts to similarities in the material culture. It is also
 useful to apply a generic analogy-to assume that what
 Murdock (1945) called "the common denominator of cul-
 tures" applies also to prehistoric peoples. The link between
 a particular type of pottery and a particular religion must
 indeed be tenuous; but if in the entire ethnographic record
 there is no people without a belief in the supernatural,
 one should not succumb to a materialist explanation of
 all prehistoric phenomena. Cook (1946), for instance, offers
 a detailed and entirely plausible argument that from the
 late 14th to the early 16th century human sacrifice and
 war may have accounted for as much as 20% of the mortality
 in Central Mexico. He is unwilling, however, to accept
 the religious significance of propitiation of the gods or
 of the waging of war in part to replenish a waning supply
 of victims. His straightforward account of these ideational
 motives is muddled by the supposition that because "the
 margin of subsistence was becoming somewhat precarious,"
 there was a "social urge" to check population growth. Is
 it not a remarkably straitjacketed view of history to hold
 that mass slaughter ostensibly in support of an ideology
 in fact must mask an unfavorable balance between popula-
 tion and resources?
 In a demographic analysis, stretching the plausibilities
 of ethnographic analogy does not carry one very far, for
 typically the record of contemporary primitives lacks solid
 statistics and analyses about population. The painstaking
 compilation by Krzywicki (1934) is a collection of data mostly
 too poor to be useful, and in the four decades since it
 appeared, in spite of the excellence of particular studies,
 the overall picture has improved but little. We know more
 about kin structure than about family size, more about
 beliefs in the afterworld than about causes of death or
 the expectation of life, more about the structure of roles
 than that of age categories. Thus, when some of the best
 of today's anthropologists try to establish demographic
 generalities (e.g., Naroll 1962), they typically draw their
 presumably universal conclusions from a very small number
 of cultures (but see Naroll and Sipes 1973).
 Petersen: PREHISTORIC DEMOGRAPHY
 THE BALANCE BETWEEN POPULATION AND RESOURCES
 A narrowly materialist interpretation of prehistoric societies
 is encouraged, of course, by the fact that-except in places
 where archeology overlaps with history-material artifacts
 typically constitute the sole basis for every reconstruction
 of their institutions. This bias was strongly reinforced by
 the influence of Gordon Childe, whose talent as an ar-
 cheologist was magnified by his adeptness in finding mem-
 orable phrases ("the neolithic revolution," "the urban revo-
 lution") in his highly readable popularizations (e.g., Childe
 1955). In Childe's work the effect of economic factors on
 any society was dictated by a rather simple-minded Marx-
 ism: even at the height of the cult of personality, rather
 few Western scholars would have cited Stalin to validate
 the observation that "the natural resources of its habitat"
 are among "the forces of production" that determine a
 society's structure (Childe 1951:35). As Braidwood and
 Howe (1960:chap. 1) put it, Childe's "tendency toward a
 materialistic philosophy of history rather forced his inter-
 pretations into the realms of what Redfield referred to
 as the technical order, to the exdusion of changes in the
 moral order." Originally, these authors report, their think-
 ing was "strongly influenced" by Childe, but once in the
 field, as they tried actually to test his hypotheses, they
 established a more and more independent conceptual base.
 They rejected such terms as mesolithic and neolithic, which
 group together chronology, technical innovations, and
 cultural interpretations. Rather than combining all of these
 a priori and thus imprecisely, Braidwood and Howe ana-
 lyzed them separately to the degree that this was possible.
 Binford (1968) extrapolates from this exchange to an
 even more forthright denial of the axioms on which Childe's
 theorizing was based (cf. Sabloff, Beale, and Kurland 1973).
 It is not true, in Binford's view, that post-Pleistocene man
 was continuously trying to increase his food supply or,
 thus, that he had time to elaborate his culture only when
 he was freed from this preoccupation with the quest for
 subsistence (pp. 326-28):
 While hunting-gathering populations may vary in density between
 different habitats in direct proportion to the relative size of standing
 food crop, nevertheless within any given habitat the population
 is homeostatically regulated below the level of depletion of the
 local food supply. ... Not only [do] hunter-gatherers have
 adequate supplies of food but they enjoy quantities of leisure
 time, much more in fact than do modern industrial or farm workers,
 or even professors of archeology.
 As before, one is inclined to doubt less the legitimacy of
 ethnographic analogy than the accuracy of worldwide
 generalizations. Is the link between hunger and work that
 Richards (1948) so plausibly traced among the Bantu merely
 to be dismissed? Is it not more likely that primitive -peoples,
 from our point of view a residual category defined
 principally by their lack of a number of attributes, should
 vary greatly in this as in other respects?
 The application of Childe's preconceptions to demogra-
 phic questions is ordinarily based on the Darwinian model.3
 By this thesis any population tends to increase up to the
 maximum that the available subsistence permits; thus,
 mortality, in particular death from starvation, is the main
 or even sole control of the growth of numbers. At least
 according to such a zoologist as Wynne-Edwards (1962,
 1970), Darwin's model of natural selection does not com-
 3 This is often called the "Malthusian" model, but quite inappro-
 priately, for in the subsequent editions of his Essay on the Principle
 of Population Malthus radically amended the simplistic model of
 the first edition (cf. Petersen 1971).
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 pletely hold even for all other animals. When the population
 of some species of fish and birds, some other classes of
 vertebrates, and some insects and crustaceans reaches what
 might be termed an optimum level, the fertility temporarily
 declines, either by a physiological adjustment or by a change
 in social behavior.
 The implication of the Darwinian model for humans
 is that one can estimate past populations from the "carrying
 capacity" of the land. Any people's habitat, as exploited
 with the techniques available in the culture, sets the maxi-
 mum to which the population can grow. Using this maxi-
 mum as the actual figure, however, must usually result
 in a considerable exaggeration. And it is hardly more
 reasonable to assert that all peoples populate the areas
 they inhabit up to a fixed proportion of the theoretical
 carrying capacity, even if this is taken to be something under
 100% (cf. Sherratt 1972). It is not my impression that the
 ethnographic record suggests a constant ratio, or even a
 narrow range, for all peoples at a given level of technology.
 If one nevertheless uses the Darwinian model, moreover,
 the existence of an economic surplus becomes a problem.
 That at least in some areas man was sufficiently relieved
 from perpetual want to permit a relaxed search for im-
 proved ways of life is ordinarily taken to be a precondition
 of cultural evolution, but how was this possible under
 Darwinian conditions? Usually the conundrum is solved
 by assuming the development of a hierarchical structure,
 of which the top layers were well fed from the excess
 produced by the lower ones (e.g., Herskovits 1952:412-13;
 Dalton 1960; Orans 1966). The solution helps little with
 respect to the small bands of hunter-gatherers, who are
 assumed-by ethnographic analogy and common sense-to
 have had a relatively unstructured society. In short, crucial
 first beginnings of cultural advance must reasonably have
 been facilitated by a relative ease. Over the longer run,
 the life of man in "a state of nature" may well have been
 "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short"; but this normal
 state was presumably interrupted by favored periods of
 perhaps several generations, a mere instant in archeological
 time. As possibly one such instance, Martin (1973) has
 hypothesized that, after the first men reached the Americas
 by way of the Bering bridge, they found a cornucopia
 of inexperienced prey and within a millennium decimated
 the native fauna.
 As applied to modern populations, the Darwinian model
 used to be challenged principally by Marxists and by
 Catholics, and in the international conferences following
 the Second World War these two camps often formed a
 strange alliance against the "neo-Malthusians" (or, typically,
 most of the professional demographers of Western coun-
 tries). More recently, scholars not associated with any of
 these ideologies have argued that population pressure, far
 from being a significant impediment to economic develop-
 ment and cultural modernization, is often (or even regular-
 ly) an important impetus to change (e.g., Boserup 1965,
 Kuznets 1967). When applied to the development of primi-
 tive peoples, the new rationale generated the same dif-
 ferences as those pertaining to economies struggling to
 reach the take-off point (e.g., Sheffer 1971, Spooner 1972,
 Alland 1972, Merrill 1972, Carneiro 1972). As before, I
 would suggest that the evidence is too thin in either context
 to warrant universal generalizations. The number of de-
 mographic analyses of developing economies as thorough
 as Coale and Hoover's (1958) of India is still pitifully small,
 in part because the data base is ordinarily too slight. Since
 the archeological record is sparser, it is even more pre-
 sumptuous to extrapolate the somewhat dubious conclu-
 sions of particular case studies to universal postulates.
 Within the rather broad confines set by a preurban culture
 and a preindustrial economy, the variation in time and
 in space must have been too great to be easily encompassed
 within any of the typical generalizations. When Zubrow
 (1971) writes, for instance, that "as an empirical generali-
 zation, [the "Malthusian" model] was valid for most of
 the pre-industrial world prior to 1760," he manages to
 compress several basic errors into a short sentence. He
 is manifestly ignorant of all of the recent work in historical
 demography, in particular that of Hajnal (1965) on mar-
 riage patterns. More fundamentally, he uses the preliminary
 statement of the principle of population that Malthus
 presented in the first, anonymous edition of his Essay,
 ignoring all of the quite basic alterations that followed it.
 In sum, the interpretation of archeological data can go
 only a very short distance without the aid of ethnographic
 analogy, and the best guard against inappropriate parallels
 is the fully conscious acceptance of appropriate ones. Such
 general strictures, however, obviously count for little. Gra-
 hame Clark, who counsels "extreme caution" in the abstract,
 in the concrete notes that contemporary Eskimo women
 prepare skins and that the presence of skin-working tools
 on the Mesolithic site at Star Carr, therefore, "argues for
 the presence of women" (Clark et al. 1954:11). But this
 is a picayune point compared with what I have called the
 generic ethnographic analogy. None of the classic studies
 of primitive peoples-Malinowski on the Trobrianders,
 Kluckhohn on the Navajo, Firth on the Tikopia, or what-
 ever-gives the slightest support to the notion that primi-
 tives' behavior patterns are encompassed by their material
 belongings, irrespective of their values and beliefs. If they
 are to be realistic, archeologists must transcend their arti-
 facts and postulate, even if without details, the existence
 of a full spiritual life in the peoples they study.
 DEMOGRAPHIC ESTIMATES
 If the models that have been used to generate demographic
 estimates are often deficient, this certainly does not mean
 that the rationale behind them is completely invalid. And
 if sometimes it has been too facilely assumed that all
 prehistoric and primitive cultures must have essentially
 similar demographic characteristics, this exaggeration does
 not challenge more modest generalizations concerning all
 such populations. Assumptions must be made, but perhaps
 less exuberantly than has been the wont.
 WHAT IS A POPULATION?
 In most discussions of modern populations, the analyst
 passes over the most basic question: what entity is being
 measured? The persons living in a particular juridically
 bounded area, typically a national state or one of its
 subdivisions, ordinarily constitute a "population," though
 this fact does not specify the concept. For different purposes
 one may want to indude in "the population of the United
 States," for instance, all actual residents, including one-day
 visitors; or only permanent residents, with "permanent"
 variously defined; or the civilian population only; or also
 the military population, either indluding or exduding
 overseas units. In other contexts the ambiguity can be
 greater. One can measure the cultural differences between
 the populations of northwestern and southern Europe, say,
 but the result will depend very much on where one draws
 the boundary between the two. Estimates of how many
 Jews the Nazis killed, as another example, vary according
 to whether one defines a Jew "racially," following the
 Nuremberg decree, or more narrowly.
 Archeologists can seldom delimit a population by a legal
 definition. As they often use the word, implicitly it means
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 the same as in zoology, a breeding group; but archeological
 data on mating and fertility are of course poorer than
 those concerning any other demographic process. Lee
 (1972a) seems to be suggesting something of this kind
 when he proposes that "instead of postulating a mean group
 size of 25, or 50, or 100 for prehistoric populations, it
 may be analytically more useful to think in temporal terms
 of the amount of time members spent in groups of various
 sizes" (cf. Birdsell 1973). The span represented in a single
 dig can constitute centuries, during which much-or noth-
 ing-may have happened to the population(s) that once
 lived there. The puzzle is typically solved by classifying
 whatever data the archeologist (or paleontologist or anthro-
 pologist) has accumulated and then associating a population
 with each of the classes (cf. Hill and Evans 1972).
 According to what Chang (1967:71) calls a reasonable
 estimate, 80 or 90% of an archeologist's time and energy
 is spent in classifying his material in order to delineate
 the "relations within a culturally meaningful system." That
 it is very easy to construct a nonsensical typology he
 illustrates with several that a stranger might fabricate out
 of a collection of American coins and bills. In a similar
 "plea for statistical caution," Brothwell (1970) offers a
 comparative morphology of gravestones in British cemeter-
 ies of the 19th and 20th centuries, from which-without
 our extraneous knowledge of so recent a period-many
 false conclusions could be drawn. The essential point is
 that there is no fixed association between the "style" of
 gravestones (or pottery, or residential structures, or what-
 ever) and a particular population. The first can change
 over time or space with no change in the other; and that
 the first remains the same over time or space does not
 mean a necessary constancy in the second.
 The most elaborate development of such a classificatory
 system was the anthropometry once used to divide the
 human species into races. As with monetary units, the
 division between any two classes depended in part on which
 physical characteristic was used, for in a population of
 widespread miscegenation the various indices of race are
 not highly correlated. More important, the indices are not,
 as hypothesized, wholly determined by heredity but can
 also be markedly affected by the habitat. As Boas (1911)
 demonstrated, the new environment of America signifi-
 cantly changed even the shape of the skull, once a major
 criterion of racial differentiation. For a while it was believed
 that serological traits are neutral with respect to human
 survival, but for at least some of them this is certainly
 not the case. In a reaction against 19th-century skulduggery,
 some anthropologists would now like to expunge the word
 race (and one sometimes feels even the concept) from
 professional writings, but this reflects a taste for puristic
 precision that virtually no classification in the real world
 will satisfy. That there are no unambiguous classes, because
 the division between them is often imprecise, is true not
 only of races but of species, as well as of all the cultural
 classifications that social scientists use routinely: between
 developed and developing, rural and urban, employed and
 unemployed, and so on.
 Following Boyd (1950:207), I define a race as "a popula-
 tion which differs significantly from other human popula-
 tions in regard to the frequency of one or more of the
 genes it possesses. It is an arbitrary matter which, and
 how many, gene loci we choose to consider as a significant
 'constellation.'" In other words, how many races exist and
 what the boundaries are between them are not immutable
 facts; each analyst can legitimately focus on the constella-
 tions relevant to the particular questions he is putting to
 the data. Since to some degree racial characteristics are
 hereditary, they are in principle a better basis for the
 classification of breeding groups than cultural artifacts, but
 Petersen: PREHISTORIC DEMOGRAPHY
 neither affords the comfortable certainty that some would
 like.
 Modern populations are more often classified by language
 than by race, and the difficulties in the two operations
 are analogous. In both instances the analysis depends on
 which "constellation" is selected out of a clustered contin-
 uum as the classificatory unit. As Sapir (1921:163-64) put
 it,
 All languages that are known to be genetically related . . . may
 be considered as constituting a "linguistic stock.". . . At any point
 in the progress of our researches an unexpected ray of light may
 reveal the "stock" as but a "dialect" of a larger group. The terms
 dialect, language, branch, stock-it goes without saying-are
 purely relative, . . . convertible as our perspective widens or
 contracts.
 Nor does it ordinarily help to combine the two imperfect
 instruments of racial and linguistic dassification in the hope
 of improving on either one. Occasional peoples such as
 Basques or Lapps constitute enclaves on both racial and
 linguistic maps, but they are exceptional. As Max Muller
 once wrote, "An ethnologist who speaks of Aryan race,
 Aryan blood, Aryan eyes and hair, is as great a sinner
 as a linguist who speaks of a dolichocephalic dictionary
 or a brachycephalic grammar." In an analysis of the interac-
 tion between racial and linguistic criteria for classifying
 the populations of Bougainville, Howells (1966) finds that
 only 11 of the 18 physically distinctive groups correspond
 to linguistic divisions. Spatial distance is insignificantly
 correlated with the degree of biological differentiation, but
 biological and linguistic "distances" are fairly well correlat-
 ed. Howells concludes (p. 535), "The most definite evidence
 leads us back, somewhat frustrated, to the conclusion which
 was the assumption of the early anthropologists: differences
 are due to pre-existing differences," at least mainly and
 overall.
 POPULATION SIZE
 In both historic and prehistoric demography, it would seem
 that one of the simplest operations is to relate the inhabited
 area to the number of persons that once lived on it. Such
 estimates, however, involve several recurrent difficulties,
 none of which can be overcome completely. An archeologi-
 cal excavation typically includes only a portion of the site,
 and to generalize from the known segment to the whole
 must ordinarily result in some slippage. Is the population
 density deduced from the completely excavated dwellings
 specific to them? Were all of the houses inhabited at the
 same time, or do they represent a number of successive
 generations living in different houses on adjacent plots?
 Thompson (1971), for example, points out that among
 the Maya it was the custom to bury a dead person in his
 hut and then abandon it and, on another scale, to move
 from one site to another as good soil became exhausted
 (but cf. Haviland 1972). In Central Mexico, similarly, "sites
 may represent those segments of a living community which
 have been abandoned during normal community opera-
 tions. All contemporary communities studied in detail in
 the Teotihuacan Valley have some structures unoccupied
 at any given time" (Charlton 1972). The dwellings inhabited
 seriatim would presumably have been constructed over
 perhaps a few decades, too short a period to be distinguished
 by almost any dating technique.
 Trying to generalize on a world scale involves more
 problems, for population density is likely to differ with
 the climate, the usual mode of construction, the number
 and type of nonresidential buildings, and the like. Even
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 in so uniform a culture as the contemporary United States,
 the density of metropolitan populations varies considerably
 between such cities as Denver, made up largely of one-
 and two-family houses, and Chicago, where most persons
 live in apartment houses. Among medieval European cities,
 the estimated number of persons per hectare varied from
 58 in Bruges to 289 in Bourges (Russell 1958:tables 63-65).
 Should one assume that the ratio of persons to inhabited
 space has a smaller range among primitive peoples? From
 18 ethnographic studies, Naroll (1962) estimated very
 roughly that each person in a primitive society requires
 10 square meters of roofed living space (cf. LeBlanc 1971).
 From California Indian tribes, Cook and Heizer (1968)
 derived 12 square meters per person. Given the wide range
 of error implicit in the calculation, the two ratios, 10 and
 12, can be interpreted as essentially identical, especially
 since the total populations derivative from either one are
 usually very small (cf. Phillips 1972). The data are limited
 to one type of population, and similar formulas are needed
 to apply this kind of analysis to hunter-gatherer bands
 and to agricultural, class-structured societies (Baker and
 Sanders 1972).
 The population-area ratio of a settlement would seem
 to imply an average household size, but calculating the
 latter typically involves additional dubious assumptions.
 There is no way of determining how the size of a nuclear
 family, one of a number of interrelated demographic
 variables, relates to that of a household. As Allen and
 Richardson (1971) point out, the difficulties in the recon-
 struction of kinship from archeological data-which in-
 herently are certainly great enough-begin with the confu-
 sion among ethnologists concerning contemporary resi-
 dence patterns. The apparently clear distinctions made a
 generation ago among types of residence rules have proved
 to be inadequate, and in any case in many societies practice
 differs significantly from the presumed norm. Among 13
 American Indian tribes, the floor area of the house assumed
 to contain a single nuclear family ranges between 119.5
 and 322 square feet (Cook 1972:table 1), and if worldwide
 data were compiled the variation would presumably be
 greater. In a stratified society, moreover, the average
 number of persons in a household or the average amount
 of space they occupy would probably differ greatly from
 the mode. In calculating a total population from the area
 of an entire settlement, one can reasonably expect that
 some of these several types of variation will average out.
 Rough guesses have been made about the size of a
 household from the capacity of cooking jars (Turner and
 Lofgren 1966) and about the size of populations from the
 skeletal remains (e.g., Howells 1960) or even the animal
 bones in garbage heaps (e.g., Phillips 1972). One wonders
 whether even the most ingenious argumentation could
 develop a plausible estimate from such data. As before,
 a comparison in the style of Brothwell's morphology of
 gravestones would suggest that an investigation of modern
 kitchens, modern cemeteries, or modern dumps would lead
 to no demographic conclusions worth recording.
 NATURAL INCREASES
 The growth of modern populations is ordinarily a secondary
 datum, derived either from a series of census enumerations
 or from a count of births and deaths. Especially when
 these primary data are deficient, an independent model
 of population growth can be a useful check. But if such
 a model is based on only an implicit rationale and is followed
 more or less blindly, the supposed tool can become a prison.
 One instance is the almost routine assumption, deduced
 from the Darwinian theory of how population relates to
 the food supply, that during the Neolithic the rate of
 increase greatly accelerated. A typical statement of this
 dogma is that "the increased food supply resulting from
 combined agriculture and dairying must have produced
 an exceedingly rapid growth of population" (Linton
 1955:237).
 Few persons who have not worked regularly with popula-
 tion data (or, alternatively, with such a phenomenon as
 the effect of an interest rate on the principal) intuitively
 feel the power of geometric growth. Malthus spent so much
 time drilling his contemporaries in two very simple -pro-
 gressions because, in fact, they were hard to get across.
 In 1971 the population of the world was increasing by
 an estimated 2.0% per year and that of various countries
 of South America or Africa by 3.4% per year. This means
 that these populations would double in, respectively, 35
 and 21 years. As dozens of writers have now shown, it
 is easy (particularly with access to a computer) to project
 such rates some decades into the future and thus to
 demonstrate, by the stupendous populations that would
 ensue, that the growth rate of the modern era is anomalous.
 It cannot have been so high very far in the past, and
 it cannot last much longer.
 Carneiro and Hilse (1966) have applied the same tech-
 nique to the population growth in the Near East during
 the Neolithic (cf. Nag 1973, Kurth 1974). They take 100,000
 to be the initial population of the area at the beginning
 of the era, 8000 B.C. If the rate of annual increase had
 been 0.5% (only a quarter of the rate at which the world's
 population is currently growing), they calculate that the
 population would have become 46,200,000,000,000 by 4000
 B.C. They go on to say (p. 179):
 The choice of a rate of even 0.13 percent results in a total population
 for the Near East in 4000 B.C. of over 18,000,000, which still
 appears excessive. . . The increase in population that occurred
 during the Neolithic period was not "exceedingly rapid." It was,
 in fact, only on the order of one-tenth of one percent per year.
 For a village of 100 this rate of increase is equivalent to a net
 gain of only one person over a 10-year period.
 Of course, there were fluctuations over these several mil-
 lennia. In especially favored areas or periods, the increase
 was undoubtedly considerably faster, but that means that
 in other places and times it was even less than 0.1 %. Overall,
 the growth was so slow as to be imperceptible during
 anyone's lifetime, and during the whole of the era the
 fertility and mortality were more or less in balance.
 MORTALITY
 As Grahame Clark (1965:chap. 3) has expounded in fascin-
 ating detail, the survival of the body's soft parts is much
 more common than most archeological works suggest. Even
 so, the direct evidence on the mortality of ancient man
 depends mainly on skeletal remains, from which rather
 little can be deduced with reasonable certainty.
 Bone pathology is not an important medical specialty
 altogether. As a visiting professor in a New York medical
 school, Henry L. Jaffe gives a single two-hour lecture on
 the subject, and that is "more than some other medical
 schools devote to skeletal pathology" (in Jarcho 1966:65-
 68). Any conclusion from only the bones of a person recently
 deceased is difficult, and during the centuries that ancient
 man's skeletons endured they usually underwent many
 changes that make a diagnosis yet more uncertain. "When
 we remember the many ways in which a pseudopathological
 appearance can be produced-or a genuine lesion ob-
 scured-it no longer seems extraordinary that paleopath-
 ologists occasionally make a wrong diagnosis. The wonder
 is that we ever make a right one" (Wells 1967). In some
 instances at least (e.g., Stewart 1966), the recent revival
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 of interest in paleopathology has meant less a development
 from such pioneers as Ales Hrdlicka and E. A. Hooton
 than a rejection of their work and a fresh start from sounder
 beginnings.
 Nor is it possible to round out the evidence very much
 from ethnographic analogy. Contact with higher cultures
 has ordinarily influenced the mortality of primitives so
 much, both negatively and positively, that one can hardly
 reconstruct the life chances of isolated hunter-gatherer
 bands. According to a summary of 16 ethnographic studies
 in various parts of the world, the proportion dying under
 1 year of age ranged from 10 to 35%, that under 5 years
 from 30 to 70%, and that under 18 years from 26 to
 35% (Polunin 1967). Some of the variation is undoubtedly
 due to the different methods used in the surveys, but there
 is also no reason to anticipate an overall uniformity among
 primitive peoples independent of their habitat, standards
 of sanitation, nutritional norms, patterns of violence, and
 therapeutic skills. Both the dominant causes of death and
 the expectations of life should differ considerably.
 In some areas, for example, food shortages have contrib-
 uted greatly to mortality and morbidity, but among native
 Hawaiians famines were relatively infrequent and mosdy
 local, causing more out-migration than deaths. The one
 exception was the famine caused by the civil wars of
 1780-96, not an instance that fits in with the Darwinian
 model (Schmitt 1970). As this example suggests, the deaths
 from organized violence are far from limited to those killed
 directly. Even the meaning given to "warfare" is not
 consistent in anthropology (e.g., Schneider 1950, Gibson
 1974), and any estimate of the mortality "caused" (however
 one stipulates that term) by war must be very loose indeed.
 Yet we know that there is a worldwide range from the
 Zulus, whose whole livelihood derived from preying on
 other tribes, to the entirely pacific Indian tribes among
 those in California.
 Estimates of ancient man's longevity can hardly be very
 precise. Whether cooperation with a demographer could
 significantly improve them depends, in short, on whether
 the archeological (or even ethnographic) data are good
 enough to apply more advanced techniques usefully. Ac-
 cording to McArthur (1966), "Given the generally inade-
 quate data we have about primitive populations, it would
 be foolish to try to generalize about the course of population
 change in Polynesia after its discovery. And because of
 the smallness of even the aggregates, none of these popula-
 tions is amenable to the sort of logic that might be applied
 to really large populations." This conclusion would seem
 to apply a fortiori to archeological data on prehistoric man,
 which are typically much thinner and even less reliable.
 The sex of skeletal remains is often problematic (Krog-
 man 1962:chap. 5). In the extreme case of the scrappy
 bits of Australopithecus recovered from several sites in East
 Africa, what earlier investigators had taken to be the male
 and female of a single species Pilbeam (1972) interpreted
 as two manlike species, one "robust" and one "gracile,"
 coexisting in the same general area. Even in the best case,
 determining the sex of a skeleton demands so much skill
 that a layman must depend on experts' testimony, which
 unfortunately is not entirely consistent. Working on Egyp-
 tian mummies, Wood Jones (cited in Genoves 1970a) found
 pelvises that he would have characterized definitely as male
 except that there were fetuses in the wombs. With the whole
 skeleton and his own method of determination, Genoves
 (1970a) believes that he can classify 99% of all remains
 correctly; but with partial skeletons or what he adjudges
 less accurate techniques, the probability of correct classi-
 fication has in his opinion fallen as low as 20%. In a recent
 survey by Acsaidi and Nemeskeri (1970:74-75), something
 like the same range in estimated accuracy is reported from
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 other authorities. These authors select 30 key characteristics
 of a skeleton, each of which can be graded on a five-point
 scale from "hypermasculine" (+2) to "hyperfeminine" (-2),
 giving a total range from +60 to -60 (pp. 87-89). The
 added precision from this scale would partly depend, of
 course, on whether the characteristics are independent of
 one another. But would not a male with a "feminine" pelvis
 also usually have a "feminine" skull?
 In the last decade or so the principal development in
 the sexing and aging of skeletal remains seems to have
 been the shift from individuals to populations. The physical
 anthropologist's professional interest in identification, as
 Giles (1970) puts it, is "focused on some population, for
 which he hopes he has, in his laboratory, a representative
 sample, and from which he can adduce such features as
 sex, age, stature, body form, disease as reflected in the
 bone, and the like" (cf. Howells 1970, 1973; Hunter and
 Garn 1972; Ditch and Rose 1972). The main issue with
 respect to sex and age, I suggest, is that this "hope" is
 hardly likely to be realized in a collection of bones from
 an archeological site. The bones of females and of infants
 and children, since they are typically thinner, are less likely
 to remain intact in equal proportion; and information from
 burial sites or epitaphs, as scholars as early as Beloch (1886)
 pointed out, is likely to be biased in the same ways. The
 problem, in other words, would seem to be to devise
 mathematical techniques based not on the postulate of a
 representative sample but on the assumption that the sample
 is systematically biased in ways and degrees still to be
 stipulated.
 In any case, a completely correct dichotomy of a popula-
 tion into males and females (as is possible, of course, with
 living primitives) is not much use for demographic analysis
 unless it is accompanied by a reasonably accurate classifica-
 tion into age categories. One common criterion for estimat-
 ing the age of skeletal remains is the degree of wear on
 teeth, but, as Vallois (1960) has pointed out (with strong
 support in Howells's commentary), no common standard
 exists on how rapidly the teeth of either fossil men or
 existing populations have worn down. Vallois would use
 the condition of teeth to judge age only up to about 12
 or 13 years, with the closing of cranial sutures serving
 as the principal index thereafter. According to Genoves
 (1970b), however, the obliteration of sutures in the skull
 "does not follow a well defined pattern"; and R. Singer
 (in Heizer and Cook 1960:212-13) gives one reason why
 this may be especially so of fossil remains: "If you put
 a drop of hydrochloric acid on a fairly well closed suture,
 you will find that after a short while the suture will open
 up.. . . Highly or fairly acid soils. . . will also open up
 sutures.. . . That so many of the fossil skulls so far have
 appeared to be of fairly young men [may be because]
 very often the soil is acid." More certainly, deaths of infants,
 children, and possibly adolescents are also typically un-
 derestimated, partly because in some cultures infants and
 children are disposed of separately and partly because-as
 I have said-the lighter bones are more likely to have
 disintegrated.
 When archeologists compare alternative methods for
 estimating age from skeletal remains, 'they seldom have
 a schedule of actual ages against which their several results
 can be checked. One must assign special weight to McKern
 and Stewart's (1957:172-73) monograph reporting the
 analysis of American soldiers killed in Korea, all of known
 age. The report is discouraging: "Individual maturational
 features or events are highly variable in a chronological
 sense.. .. [However,] viewing an unknown individual as
 a total skeleton, rather than bone by bone, [one can]
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 estimate the age at death within narrower limits." In general,
 though the steps of maturation by any of several indices
 succeed one another in order, their correlation with age
 is slight.
 The limitations noted here are well known, of course,
 to the physical anthropologists working on aging and sexing,
 and new techniques are continually being offered. If these
 prove indeed to be improvements-and on this I offer
 no opinion-one should note that most of the existent
 data comprise estimates based mainly on less reliable tech-
 niques. In the best case it will take another generation
 to reanalyze enough skeletal remains to lay a better basis
 for our impression of the population structure(s) of ancient
 man.
 Vallois (1937), studying the remains of 20 Neanderthal,
 102 Upper Paleolithic, and 65 Mesolithic individuals, found
 that the proportions dying at or under 20 years of age
 were 55, 34, and 37% respectively. If, as seems likely, the
 very high proportion of infant deaths was underrepresented
 among the surviving skeletons, the usual age at death would
 be lower than these figures suggest. Subsequent compila-
 tions by Vallois and others indicate the same general range.
 Very roughly, then, over the span of man's existence there
 have been two doublings of the expectation of life from
 birth, from under 20 years in the earliest prehistoric period
 to 35 or 40 years in preindustrial civilizations and 70 to
 75 years in today's advanced societies.
 FERTILITY
 The measurement of fertility is far more difficult than
 it might seem. The significance of "family" is ambiguous
 even in our own culture (does it include grown children
 who have moved away, or not?); and with the variety of
 kin structures to be found the world over, simple queries
 can often be misunderstood. Many peoples, out of a sense
 of privacy or a taboo, are reluctant to discuss any family
 matters with a stranger. In a fertility survey in East Africa,
 for instance, "a man who refused to give any information
 to the first two investigators finally gave the names of two
 children to the third. . . . [He] later admitted to ten
 children but still concealed a second wife in another village"
 (Richards and Reining 1954:362). And if questions are
 fully and accurately answered, the data are not always
 interpreted properly even by professional social scientists.
 For example, a survey of three "generations" on Eddystone,
 one of the Solomon Islands, seemingly showed a calamitous
 decline in the number of children per marriage, from 2.16
 to 1.28 to 0.65 (Rivers 1922:98). In fact, since there was
 no control for the age of the mother, the contrast was
 mainly between the completed fertility of the older women
 and the partial families of the younger. In general, the
 critical datum for any long-term analysis is not an annual
 rate, which can fluctuate widely, but the total number of
 children that the average couple bring into the world.
 No direct data exist, of course, on the fertility of early
 man. From the suppositions that his mortality was, by our
 standards, extraordinarily high and that his population was
 not depleted, one can conclude that the fertility must have
 been close to the physiological maximum. Indeed, most
 demographers of a generation ago assumed that this condi-
 tion more or less obtained until the modern era, when
 the development of effective contraceptives and the dis-
 solution of traditional norms presumably led to the first
 substantial decline in family size. This reconstruction has
 been proved wrong, not only for most of preindustrial
 history but also for most present-day primitives. Reproduc-
 tion up to the physiological maximum is approximated
 by the Hutterite sect in the United States (Eaton and Mayer
 1954) and the population of the Cocos-Keeling Islands
 (T. E. Smith 1960), but by few other societies at whatever
 stage of development.
 In Tikopia, for example, deliberate control of population
 growth was effected by a number of traditional means:
 nonmarriage, more or less enjoined on young men without
 land; coitus interruptus, commonly used in both extramari-
 tal and marital sex; abortion, generally restricted to extra-
 marital pregnancies; and infanticide, sanctioned at the
 discretion of the father irrespective of the child's sex.
 Exposure to the risk of pregnancy was typically not over
 the whole of a woman's fecund years: marriage was later
 than at puberty, and the remarriage of widows was rare.
 These conscious mechanisms were supplemented by the
 effects of such other traditional practices as interisland
 voyages and wars, by which many young males were lost
 (Firth 1957:163, 373-74). From an early survey of primitive
 cultures, Carr-Saunders (1922) concluded that all of them
 include customs whose primary function is to restrict the
 increase of population: abstention from marriage, delayed
 marriage, periodic abstention from intercourse, coitus in-
 terruptus, prolonged lactation, other types of contraception,
 abortion, and/or infanticide. Whatever fault one may find
 with this generalization, it is certainly far more valid than
 its contrary-that primitives ordinarily follow the Darwin-
 ian model.
 If we speculate about the beginnings of population
 control, ethnographic analogy can take us only to a choice
 of models. In many species, the check to further growth
 through mortality is supplemented, as I have noted, by
 a physiological or instinctive behavioral adjustment of the
 fertility. Konrad Lorenz and others have extended this
 process to humans, but with little evidence to support their
 notion. The only study I was able to find was by three
 Yugoslav physicians, who report that peasants who migrated
 to the city and got stressful jobs in a crowded and noisy
 factory became sterile for an average of three years (Mi-
 lojkovic, Simic, and Dzumhur 1972). In the human species
 the control of fertility is mainly cultural, only incidentally
 physiological. If only through infanticide, man has always
 had the capability of limiting the number of his offspring,
 and the question is when and under what conditions he
 would be motivated to exercise this control. There is no
 reason to suppose that the transition took place in a single
 'stage"; rather, if mortality varied from one prehistoric
 culture to another as much as I have suggested, one should
 expect a parallel variation in the development of fertility
 control from the occasional practice of individuals to the
 institutionalized norms of societies.
 Moreover, there is no reason a priori to date this process
 late in the prehistoric era. Lee (1972b) has shown that
 among the !Kung Bushmen, hunter-gatherers in transition
 to a sedentary life, the burden of rearing children is
 becoming markedly less. When the band is on the move,
 the mother has to carry her young child or children. From
 estimates of the weight of a child of each age and the
 total distance covered per year, one can calculate the work
 load per mother, and thus the incentive to space births.
 In this tribe the first pregnancy comes three to five years
 after puberty, and extended lactation keeps the interval
 between subsequent births at about three to five years.
 "Data on the Kung (who are in one sense on the threshold
 of the Neolithic) suggest that sedentarization alone may
 trigger population growth, since women may have children
 more frequently without any increase in work on their
 part and without reducing their ability to provide for each
 one" (Lee 1972b:342). The generalization one might derive
 from Lee's paper, that hardship stimulates the control of
 births and an enhanced well-being increases fertility, is
 hardly in accord, however, with the thesis that "the demand
 for oysters and champagne, not for basic bread and butter,
 234 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY
This content downloaded from 142.132.4.169 on Tue, 20 Feb 2018 22:48:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 triggers off social conventions which hold human popula-
 tions down" (Douglas 1966). It is also reasonable to suppose
 with Angel (1972) that the shift to sedentary life improves
 a tribe's diet and therefore its health, and thus raises both
 the proportion of females surviving to childbearing years
 and the average woman's fecundity.
 DEPOPULATION
 One method of estimating the past populations of primitive
 peoples is to postulate that there was a sizable or even
 calamitous decline following the first contacts with civiliza-
 tion and to extrapolate backward from the more recent,
 comparatively well authenticated counts. By way of ethno-
 graphic analogy, the technique can also affect our idea
 of the probable size of prehistoric populations. The thesis
 certainly has some validity. Infectious diseases, always more
 virulent in a fresh population, have often devastated primi-
 tive peoples, who almost by definition are more isolated
 and thus more likely to encounter them for the first time.
 In any power struggle with representatives of an advanced
 technology, primitives invariably lost out, with sometimes
 quite serious losses of population. The introduction of such
 new weapons as steel knives or repeating rifles also made
 their own wars more deadly. And the disruption effected
 by the infiltration of the sometimes deleterious elements
 of alien cultures could be cumulative. The social structure
 of a primitive people, though sometimes resilient in the
 face of reverses associated with their own tradition, often
 proved to be fragile in an encounter with a higher culture,
 for the social constraints of a nonliterate society typically
 rest, in Durkheim's terms, on mechanical rather than
 organic solidarity. Indeed, the causes of depopulation
 comprise so impressive a list that the problem would seem
 to be how it happened anywhere that some primitives
 survived.
 The commentary that Pitt-Rivers (1927:19) offered on
 the process in the Pacific islands is still largely true today
 (but cf. McArthur 1968):
 During the past fifty or sixty years the dying out of the native
 Pacific populations has frequently been the subject of official and
 unofficial inquiries, and it is remarkable that there is as little
 agreement on the subject now as when it was first investigated.
 ... No satisfactory system or method has been established, and,
 largely in consequence of this, during the whole period few exact
 vital statistics are obtainable which might throw light upon the
 matter and establish the correctness or otherwise of diagnostic
 attempts.
 Pitt-Rivers compiled an amusing table listing the "causes"
 of depopulation among South Sea Islanders. In the first
 column was, for example, the allegation that the abolition
 of headhunting, by depriving the natives of their chief
 interest in life, had brought about a despondency which
 eventually decreased fertility; in the second, the argument
 that headhunting continued and contributed to a high
 mortality. In the first, again, were listed various types of
 European foods or clothing condemned as unsuitable, and
 in the second various types of native food, clothing, housing,
 and so on that were denounced as unsanitary. Analysts
 have found it all too easy to ascribe depopulation to any
 prior condition, whether the persistence of elements of
 the native culture or the change in these by acculturation.
 Post hoc, ergo propter hoc has seldom been applied so freely.
 Depopulation was far from universal, and where it
 occurred its severity varied greatly. For example, among
 three 17th-century peoples in the Caribbean area, the
 Indians of Hispaniola (Haiti) were nearly extinct within
 a single generation, the Omagua were reduced by half
 within 40 years, and the neighboring Cocama retained about
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 their original numbers to a recent count (Steward 1949).
 In the New Hebrides, the population of some islands-for
 instance, "Tanna, Malo, Paama, Merelava, and probably
 Tongoa" (Felix Speiser, in Rivers 1922:51)-increased. It
 would seem that Eskimo populations have generally grown
 since market products were added to their traditional
 subsistence economy and that, except for the coastal villages
 along the Bering and Beaufort Seas, this increase took
 place without a prior decline (Hughes 1965). How difficult
 it is to check these assertions can be illustrated from one
 example Hughes gives-the Angmagssalik Eskimos on the
 east coast of Greenland, who numbered 413 when Holm
 discovered them in 1884 and have apparently increased
 without interruption since then. The statistics that the
 Danish government collects are based not on tribal units
 but on places, of which the inhabitants are designated as
 either born in Greenland or not. If one assumes that those
 resident in the commune of Angmagssalik who had been
 born in Greenland are Angmagssalik Eskimos, then Hughes
 is correct in his assertion. At the end of 1971 the population,
 so defined, was 2,249 (Denmark 1973:table 3B). In general,
 however, many Eskimos have some white forebears, and
 in that sense-but in that sense only-the figure may be
 too high.
 In the most recent period, one must emphasize, indige-
 nous peoples are often increasing faster than the surround-
 ing population-the Navaho in the United States, for
 instance, or the Maori in New Zealand (Borrie 1959, Pool
 1967). Often, as their numbers grow, so does their pride
 in their heritage, and their nativist accounts of a more
 or less legendary past support the supposition that a large
 and prosperous people flourished before the Europeans
 came.
 If past populations are estimated from the maximurmi
 carrying capacity of various habitats, the figures, as I have
 noted, are usually too high. Using this technique, Sapper
 (cited in Steward 1949:656) arrived at a range of 37 to
 48.5 million natives of the Americas at the end of the
 15th century. Moreover, the first actual figures for any
 area are likely to be set by explorers, missionaries (cf. Schmitt
 1967), or administrators, all of whom can improve their
 reputation by upping the numbers they have, in their several
 ways, dealt with. So astute an anthropologist as Kroeber
 found it appropriate, therefore, to cut all estimates of the
 Indian population derived from Spanish sources; Dobyns,
 on the contrary, established their validity by pointing out
 that they often support each other. There is a natural
 inclination, moreover, to generalize from the most striking
 examples of population decline. Dobyns (1966), thus, esti-
 mated the "nadir," or lowest level of population, from
 modern estimates or censuses, then multiplied it by a
 measure of depopulation based on guesses about cata-
 strophic losses. For the whole of the Central Andes, for
 instance, Dobyns relied on the depopulation in areas that
 had suffered an estimated loss of 1-6 or even 2 whereas 1625'
 according to a detailed analysis of just this region (C. T.
 Smith 1970) the depletion may have been from something
 over 400,000 to something under 100,000-certainly dra-
 matic enough for most tastes.
 Finally, in many instances the loss of population was
 statistical rather than physical. Many natives disappeared
 by the route of race mixture. "When is a Maori a 'Maori'?"
 (Pool 1961) is a question that, appropriately specified, must
 be posed as the prelude to virtually every analysis of the
 population of primitive peoples (cf. Petersen 1969). Primi-
 tives' most usual response to disaster perhaps was to move
 out of its path. With the poor statistics available to present-
 day compilers, such migrations are likely to be interpreted
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 as still more depopulation, for those escaping from oppres-
 sion in one area were hardly likely to advertise their presence
 in another.
 In the Middle West of the United States there is a vast
 number of mounds, 10,000 in the Ohio Valley alone, built
 centuries ago by a people that vanished completely before
 there were any whites on the continent. No one knows
 why, and the lack of fact stimulated a lush growth of
 speculation. The builders of the mounds became the Mound
 Builders, and from their paltry remains were deduced the
 qualities of a diligent and noble race. It would be a useful
 exercise for those intent on magnifying the population
 losses elsewhere to ponder on this example of romantic
 fallacy, as recounted in Silverberg's (1968) "archeology of
 a myth."
 Might not the frequent exaggeration of the depopulation
 of primitives be based on a similar stance? The general
 unreliability of all estimates would not of itself prejudice
 the figures in either direction. The bias, I would conjecture,
 is founded on two predisposing tendencies. The self-selec-
 tion of persons who become ethnologists is strongly rein-
 forced by their training, of which the usual product regards
 nonliterate peoples with full, even fulsome, sympathy. And
 anthropologists are hardly immune from the mood in all
 the social sciences that designates modern civilization, and
 especially its liberal capitalist version, as largely evil. When-
 ever these two types of cultures came into contact, however,
 the overall superiority of modern civilization was inescapa-
 ble. Analysts who regret this imbalance in technical skill,
 political power, and moral force may fall back on represent-
 ing the depopulation of primitives as a kind of G6tterdaim-
 merung. One senses a striving for the dramatic in the
 climbing estimates, for example, of the pre-Conquest popu-
 lation of the Americas, from 8.5 million in 1939 (A. L.
 Kroeber, cited by Steward 1949:656) to 100 million in 1962
 (Woodrow Borah, cited with approval by Dobyns 1966:414)
 to 113 million (the higher estimate of Dobyns himself).
 MIGRATION
 In a world relatively unpopulated by humans, presumably
 each small band of gatherers or hunters would follow
 wherever the available subsistence led, moving only a few
 miles a day but eventually perhaps covering considerable
 distances. As Childe (1950:93) surmised, "Assuming quite
 short shifts of territory every 12 years or so, it would take
 only a few centuries for a modest initial population to
 spread from say the Drave to the Harz." For ancient man,
 migration was not an occasional aberration from a settled
 life, but the norm; as I have indicated, every other de-
 mographic characteristic, from the definition of a popula-
 tion to any estimate of depopulation, is partly based on
 (usually implicit) assumptions about it (cf. Kurth 1963).
 The reconstitution of prehistoric migrations from any
 type of current data ordinarily consists of three steps: (1)
 classifying the data into a spatial pattern, (2) discounting
 the factors other than migration that might have changed
 the pattern, and (3) inferring migrations from the remain-
 ing systematic differences in the pattern. Embedded in
 the schema at point (2) is that hoary dispute concerning
 repeated invention versus diffusion from a single source,
 and in its current phase the argument is sometimes still
 as dogmatic as in the 19th century. Thus, Coon's (1962)
 thesis that the human species evolved through a conver-
 gence of discrete hominid stocks, though offered with an
 expertise that seemingly would have demanded respectful
 attention, has been rejected by most scholarly reviewers
 out of hand. In a major work of folklore methodology
 (Krohn 1971:58, 126-27), as a completely different instance,
 it is axiomatic that "the variants being compared all go
 back to one parent form.. . . Even one single independent
 reoccurrence of a complicated form-for example, the
 Cinderella tale-as the result of the general similarity of
 human fantasy or pure chance is highly unlikely." Varia-
 tions, moreover, generally "increase progressively in the
 direction of migration." The analysis of folklore so con-
 ceived consists in the search for the Urform, its geographical
 placement, and the tracing of routes of diffusion from
 that nucleus.
 Perhaps the simplest example of a reconstructed past
 migration is that given in Jackson's (1953) masterful work
 on the relation between Brittonic (the language that the
 Celts had brought to Britain) and early English. He uses
 geographic place names, especially of rivers, to mark the
 westward movement of the Angles and the gradual retreat
 of the Celts. East of a line running north from the Isle
 of Wight, Brittonic names are rare and are confined almost
 entirely to large and medium-sized rivers. At the other
 extreme, Monmouthshire remained Brittonic until at least
 the Norman conquest, most of Cornwall until the 18th
 century, and much of Wales to the present day; and in
 this area the names of rivers are overwhelmingly Celtic.
 "From the evidence of place names it is clear that in point
 of fact the British population was nowhere completely
 exterminated, though it certainly survived more fully in
 some areas than in others" (Jackson 1953:234). This seems
 a very large conclusion from so slight a base. If we imitate
 Brothwell's exercise with modern gravestones and ask what
 relation the existence of Indian place names in the American
 Middle West has to an Indian population, or Spanish names
 in California to Spanish, or Polynesian names in Hawaii
 to native Hawaiian, we impose a stricter test than Jackson
 put to his own thesis.
 Nor does an attempt to reconstruct prehistoric migrations
 from the present distribution of human races (e.g., Taylor
 1928) lead to an unambiguous conclusion. As I have noted,
 the hypothesis that certain physical traits are wholly heredi-
 tary has been disproved with respect to some and is an
 unproved assumption with respect to others. To the degree
 that racial characteristics respond to environmental influ-
 ences, it is impossible to deduce a prior contact from present
 similarities. To the degree that physical traits are inherited,
 the decisive factor is the separation of gene pools, and
 this can be effected either by migration or by such a social
 pattern as caste endogamy. Migration, while it generally
 results in sexual isolation, is not a necessary condition to
 it.
 Whether we depend on the present distribution of races,
 of languages, or of artifacts, there is no reason to assume
 that their diffusion invariably used human migration as
 its vehicle. "It is plain that most culture changes from
 without have occurred through subtler and more gradual
 or piecemeal operations" (Kroeber 1948:473). And if a
 similarity among surviving artifacts does reasonably indicate
 a prior migration, one cannot necessarily determine which
 way the prehistoric bands went. After citing four archeolo-
 gists who reconstructed a Neolithic migration from the
 Danube basin to what is now Macedonia, Childe (1950:50)
 suggested-"reluctantly"-that the movement had been in
 the opposite direction. An analogous state of knowledge
 would leave us in doubt whether Englishmen populated
 the United States or Americans England.
 COMMENT
 Some instructors in field methods, I am told, advise their
 fledgling ethnographers to start the study of any people
 with a census, and in the undoubtedly prejudiced view
 of a demographer this is excellent counsel. To have a count
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 of the two sexes, the several main age brackets, the families,
 the social and economic and cultural characteristics is to
 have a map to guide the analyst to whatever topic he desires,
 with many of the links and patterns already suggested.
 Yet until quite recently the study of population was alien
 to most anthropologists. A recent survey of the subdiscipline
 (Baker and Sanders 1972) does list many items, but most
 pertain to such adjacent fields as human genetics or physical
 anthropology. One senses that a breakthrough is coming,
 and perhaps it will be hastened by collaborative efforts
 (e.g., Romaniuk and Piche 1972); the population analysis
 of even so valuable a monograph as Firth's study of the
 Tikopia was much improved in a subsequent paper written
 jointly with a demographer (Borrie, Firth, and Spillius
 1957). In the longer run, a larger proportion of working
 anthropologists and archeologists will themselves acquire
 the quite modest technical expertise on which demographic
 analysis is based. From this nucleus may develop a general
 awareness that data on age-sex structure are worth gather-
 ing and, thus, eventually a far better factual base for
 comparative studies.
 Until some of this development takes place in anthro-
 pology, the direct benefits of ethnographic analogy to
 prehistoric demography will continue to be slight. Once
 that small step has been taken, the more fundamental
 problems in archeological research will become more mani-
 fest. Much of the work pertaining to the population of
 early man, it seems to me, is compromised by fale pre-
 mises-has gotten off to a wrong start by not asking the
 right questions.
 There seems now to be a widespread consensus that
 the Darwinian model, which cast Homo sapiens as one more
 mammalian species responding more or less automatically
 to his environment, is inadequate. The conditions that set
 man's fertility, mortality, and migration patterns were
 always in part physiological and physical, but they were
 also cultural and social. To permit the difficulties in gather-
 ing nonmaterial data to reshape one's conceptual frame-
 work makes for poor science. In some respects, as Willey
 (1968) seems to agree even in his critical statement, the
 new emphasis on "settlement archeology" that K. C. Chang
 and others proposed would seem to be a step toward a
 better-rounded social analysis. From settlement patterns
 it may be possible to deduce first community patterns and
 then several of the social structures basic to demographic
 analysis-though indeed with the recognition that "limita-
 tions will always be with us" (Sears 1961). Demography
 makes use of mathematical models and is related to such
 physiological subdisciplines as genetics, but it is itself a
 social science.
 The usual generalizations concerning the demographic
 characteristics of prehistoric man often strike one as too
 broad, extrapolations from a few nonrandom cases to a
 supposed typicality. Perhaps it will never be possible to
 do more, for some of the difficulties are inherent to
 archeology; but it may be feasible, given the will, to indicate
 not a figure but a range, with some stipulation of the
 preconditions that govern the probable level of fertility
 and mortality in various settings. To the eye of modern
 man, all primitives look alike; but certainly it is the goal
 of a professional observer of primitive society to transgress
 this view.
 Prehistoric demography, finally, shares with many analy-
 ses of other types of population a disposition to see the
 growth of numbers mainly, or even only, as a dependent
 variable. Whatever the general worth of Boserup's coun-
 terthesis (1965), it at least led to the discussion typified
 in the work edited by Spooner (1972). In the context of
 the transition from hunter-gatherer bands to the first urban
 settlements, the increase in population stimulated the rise
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 of new institutions, more complex social structures. De-
 mographic factors, in short, typically are both cause and
 effect, elements in a material-cultural complex; and to view
 them as only the consequence of Neolithic or urban revolu-
 tions is, like any other monistic theory, distortive.
 Abstract
 The direct data on the population of prehistoric man are
 typically too sparse to be used alone. However, such
 supports as the population-resources model can easily
 become distortive prisons rather than aids to analysis, and
 the most important general point from ethnographic anal-
 ogy-that contemporary primitives differ widely in their
 demographic characteristics but in all cases these are affect-
 ed by a belief in the supernatural-is seldom reflected
 in discussions of ancient man.
 There is every reason to believe that the conscious control
 of procreation was practiced in prehistoric times, and one
 can surmise that the shift from ranging to a sedentary
 life resulted in a rise in fertility. Early death was prevalent,
 but one should note also that the age at death undoubtedly
 varied considerably according to a people's therapeutic
 skills, nutritional standards, proclivity toward violence, and
 the like. The balance between births and deaths, the growth
 or decline of a population, is no easier to estimate, para-
 doxically, than its two components. The numbers of persons
 inhabiting a site at successive dates do not constitute data
 that archeological evidence yields easily and automatically.
 Such factors as migration and race mixture, often impossible
 even to guess at, complicate the estimation of population
 growth and structure.
 During the past two decades a new interest in the
 demography of prehistoric man has developed, and one
 can anticipate a considerable improvement in the techniques
 of analysis over the next generation.
 Comments
 by ROBERT J. BRAIDWOOD
 The Oriental Institute, 1155 E. 58th St., Chicago, Ill. 60637,
 U.S.A. 18 x 74
 As regards the Near East, I would guess that had Petersen
 fully realized the flimsiness of most of the available pertinent
 evidence, he would have been even more pessimistic.
 Ideally, our Near Eastern evidence bearing on ancient
 demography will gradually become more complete and
 informative. This is bound to take a long time, however,
 not only because of financial, logistic, and political com-
 plications but also because of the development and applica-
 tion of more subtle methodologies.
 It is instructive to select almost any of the now available
 Near Eastern site reports (for early historic as well as
 prehistoric time ranges) and to compute the proportion
 of areas exposed to that of over-all surface indication of
 original occupation. At Jarmo, for example, where our
 upper-level exposures were relatively large as Near Eastern
 excavations go, the proportion of exposure to probable
 total settlement area was ca. 7% (and it was reckoned that
 a third of the original site had been completely eroded
 away). For the deepest levels, however, the proportion was
 only ca. 0.8%. These figures, especially the latter, hardly
 suggest an adequate sampling of over-all settlement plans
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 or even of possible house-type variations.
 Furthermore, Petersen is quite right in pointing out that
 we cannot yet be certain, even were a complete settlement
 exposed, that every structure was indeed occupied at any
 one given moment of time. I have seen many quite flourish-
 ing contemporary villages with up to a quarter of their
 mud-walled structures already vacant and slumping into
 ruin. Even more, we have as yet no foolproof means of
 assessing which of the mud wall-butts hitherto excavated
 were in fact the foundations of walls of rooms within roofed
 domestic structures and which of enclosures open to the
 sky (courtyards, sheep/goat folds, etc.?).
 Hence, I myself remain very unimpressed with applica-
 tions of the 10 to 12 square meters per person rule, as
 regards sites in the Near East. There has been increasing
 need for such a sobering article as is Petersen's on prehistoric
 demography.
 by HENRY F. DOBYNS
 University of Wisconsin-Parkside, Kenosha, Wis. 53402,
 U.S.A. 9 xi 74
 Ohio State anthropologists and geographers are to be
 commended for involving a demographer in seeking tech-
 niques to improve interpretation of archeological data.
 Some danger nonetheless inheres in asking demographers
 to deal seriously with population data from nonindustrial
 societies. Some comments on my (1966) discussion of Native
 American population evidenced that danger. Petersen's
 pontifical perambulation repeatedly realizes it.
 Petersen misstates one "method" for estimating past
 populations of primitive peoples as postulating sizeable
 decline after initial contact with civilization. Actually my
 technique, which he cites, estimated precontact population
 magnitude by reconstructing, as well as data allow, the
 scale of depopulation, following fundamental work by Cook
 and Borah (1960). They (1971:73-118) have since devel-
 oped a more sophisticated approximation technique.
 Moreover, Petersen overlooks conscientious reconstruc-
 tions of catastrophic Native American population decline
 in Hispaniola (Cook and Borah 1971:376-410) and Colom-
 bia (Cook and Borah 1971:411-29; Colmenares 1969;
 Friede 1963, 1965, 1967), war as a depopulant among New
 England Indians (Cook 1973), careful assessment of
 depopulation by the first New World pandemic (Crosby
 1967; 1972:35-63), and monumental quantification of dis-
 eases and famine as factors depopulating Cholula (Malvido
 1973). If "climbing estimates" of preconquest Native Amer-
 ican population are "dramatic," it is not because Borah
 or Dobyns strove for drama, but because Kroeber was less
 astute than Petersen thinks.
 Because Petersen resorts to imputing bias based upon
 value positions he ascribes to ethnographers as a class,
 it seems appropriate to offer specific refutation. Petersen
 sees anthropologists as sharing a social-science mood that
 condemns as evil modern civilization, especially its "liberal
 capitalistic version." While I do not share a Charles Wilson
 view that what is good for General Motors is good for
 the United States, I do invest in common stocks. I admire
 achievements of companies and corporations which are
 truly capitalistic and not so tied to government as to be
 functionally socialistic. I have even employed the laissez
 faire language of the U.S. Constitution to provide an
 evaluation framework for overseas guided cultural change
 programs (Holmberg, Dobyns, and V'azquez 1960, 1961).
 Petersen stereotypes ethnologists as regarding nonliterate
 peoples "with full, even fulsome, sympathy." Hard-won
 standards of modern research demand that anthropologists
 dwell for long periods among those whom they study. They
 inevitably develop close personal friendships with individu-
 als. That does not mean anthropologists like all persons
 in a society studied, or even find the society congenial.
 I find six sociocultural systems in which I have conducted
 research definitely differentially likeable (Dobyns 1971,
 1972, 1973; Dobyns, Doughty, and Lasswell 1971; Dobyns
 and Euler 1970; Euler and Dobyns 1971).
 by WOLFRAM EBERHARD
 Department of Sociology, University of California, Berkeley,
 Calif. 94720, U.S.A. 8 x 74
 Petersen's article should have a sobering effect on archeolo-
 gists and historians; it should also warn those who accept
 reports on the decimation of "natives" in the Americas
 and the South Seas that the reliability of some recent
 estimates is shaky.
 I would like to raise the question to what degree religious
 beliefs may influence fertility. In a study of Chinese beliefs,
 I found that there are numerous restrictions on intercourse:
 intercourse in certain places or at certain times may displease
 certain deities; intercourse after a heavy dinner, after
 midnight, during a storm or an earthquake, etc., is regarded
 as harmful. If all the restrictions are counted, there remain
 hardly more than 100 days per year during which inter-
 course is approved. As these 100 days may not often coincide
 with the fertile period of the woman's cycle, customs of
 this kind could restrict fertility. Even modern handbooks
 on sex in China warn the man against having intercourse
 too often; the ideal number for a specific age is much
 lower than that given in Western books (Eberhard 1967:
 204-5). A comparison of birth data obtained in Pakistan
 indicated that during the hot months of summer, many
 fewer children were conceived than during autumn and
 winter. It seemed that summer temperatures reduced sexual
 activity (unpublished field notes, 1965-68).
 When Petersen says that "marriage was later than at
 puberty," he means, at least for India and Pakistan, that
 marriage in the physical sense of cohabitation was later
 than puberty, while legal marriage often took place earlier.
 In addition, I found that often the young wife conceived
 only after one or two years of actual marriage, perhaps
 as a consequence of poor physical condition.
 In the discussion of depopulation, I might mention that
 it seems that the whole non-Chinese population of large
 areas of Central and South China has disappeared. Today,
 we do not explain this simply as genocide, but rather assume
 that more and more non-Chinese young women were
 married by Chinese men, who could, by doing so, save
 most of the large bridal gift they had to make when they
 married a Chinese woman. The non-Chinese men, then,
 had more and more difficulty in finding wives, and as
 they often could not make a living without a wife to work
 with as a team, would remain unmarried or migrate to
 the Chinese cities where, again, they would disappear as
 a "minority" and be accounted for, if at all, as "Chinese."
 by ROBERT E. KENNEDY, JR.
 Department of Sociology, University of Minnesota,
 Minneapolis, Minn. 55455, U.S.A. 12 xii 74
 Petersen has made a significant contribution to the study
 of prehistoric demography through his insights into areas
 of research in anthropology and archeology where, from
 the demographic perspective, inappropriate assumptions
 are being made or the wrong questions are being asked.
 His discussion may serve a dual purpose: to stimulate
 anthropologists and archeologists to reconsider some of
 their basic suppositions on population matters and to help
 demographers better understand the major issues related
 to population with which anthropologists and archeologists
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 are concerned. Speaking as a demographer, I believe
 Petersen has carried out his task with a combination of
 detail and comprehensiveness which few other demogra-
 phers could have achieved.
 Petersen poses the question whether prehistoric demog-
 raphy would be improved by systematic cooperation be-
 tween researchers in the area and demographers. My
 response is "yes, but...." The recurrent problem of a
 lack of data appropriate for demographic analysis might
 have been avoided, at least in some cases, if a demographer
 had taken part in initial decisions regarding procedures
 to be used to collect and organize data. But as a practical
 matter, it may be more feasible for anthropologists and
 archeologists to learn elementary demographic methods
 themselves than to find a demographic colleague who is
 available for collaboration when needed. I agree with
 Petersen that demographic analysis can begin with a rather
 modest level of technical expertise, and that such basic
 demographic sophistication can multiply the analytic power
 of any population data which may happen to be available.
 by GoTrFRIED KURTH
 Techn. Universitit, Anthropologie, Postfach 3329, D 33
 Braunschweig, Federal Republic of Germany. 11 xii 74
 Petersen's paper should be interesting and stimulating not
 only for prehistoric demography, but also for pa-
 leoanthropology and population genetics-i.e., the approx-
 imative interpretation of evolutive processes during homi-
 nisation. Many anthropologists tend to oversimplify to the
 point of a kind of absolutisation the possible effect of a
 single factor or a few factors biologically regulating popula-
 tion processes. We should never forget that we can offer
 only working hypotheses and a scientific time-picture
 (Jeweilsbild) for any interpretation of past or present pro-
 cesses.
 In the course of my training in physical anthropology
 and prehistory, including long experience in the excavation
 of settlements and cemeteries, I often confronted two basic
 questions: What was the size of the permanent population
 reflected by this cemetery? To what degree are the burials
 excavated representative of this population? The problem
 of reconstructing relatively correct age pyramids and
 reproduction rates for populations without written records
 or statistically correct calculations stimulated my interest
 in paleodemography. We started with research on villages
 and families and reached the 17th century for some villages
 and the 14th century for families. Surprisingly, the average
 number of offspring per reproductive family was much
 lower than usually believed. More important for population
 increase in the long run was not increase in the mean
 offspring per couple, but decrease in the relatively high
 average age at marriage and increase in the average
 frequency of marriage. I believe that earlier populations
 reached a kind of self-regulation of population mostly by
 regulating these factors, whether intentionally or uninten-
 tionally. I'm sure that Homo sapiens sapiens since the Upper
 Paleolithic has had enough insight to achieve a "floating
 balance" (Fliessgleichgewicht) between food supply and pop-
 ulation numbers through social, economic, and/or ritual
 control of when an adult gets the permission of his group
 to marry and to whom. Additionally, observations of so-
 called primitive peoples demonstrate that groups even
 regulate the desirable interval between births-e.g.,
 through coitus taboos-and have sufficient knowledge to
 avoid fertilization and to produce abortion.
 Important in any case, also in the long run, was the
 mean duration of a generation. My definition of the
 effective duration of a generation is half the sum of the
 ages of man and wife at marriage plus the time until the
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 birth of the first child that survives until reproduction.
 This biologically correct calculation is independent of the
 time of menarche or first ejaculation and considers the
 (different) socially determined regulations as well as the
 possible losses from high death rate of infants or juveniles
 before self-reproduction. For any calculation of the possible
 tempo of evolutive processes, the length of time before
 the next generation offers new gene combinations for
 selection (generally limited, by other factors, in number)
 is important for the effective realization of new gene
 combinations.
 Cultural remains never offer a basis for calculating even
 approximately the contemporary permanent population
 numbers. Unfortunately, numerable human remains also
 seldom offer an exact basis for the reconstruction of the
 permanent population. In most cases our human remains
 offer only a section of the contemporary population of
 the area. The only representative series may be those with
 a conical age distribution according to age at death. In
 this connection, we should use for comparison the age
 pyramids and death distributions only of preindustrial rural
 populations, which by 1800 had at last achieved a life
 expectancy for the newborn of 20 years. From this it seems
 relatively unimportant whether we can determine more
 or less exactly the age at death of human skeletal remains
 or not. We know that, in any case, the percentage of
 individuals over 50 years of age for such populations was
 on the average very small.
 The value as evidence of human skeletal remains may
 be limited by, e.g., different burial customs for newborns,
 children, and "socially recognized" individuals and the
 greater probability of preservation of the larger and thicker
 bones of adults. If the death curve from 0 to 20 years
 coincides with the probable life expectancy, but we have
 more adults, we should regard it as one explanation that
 many adults may have been unmarried. Our paleode-
 mographic research demonstrates that in most cases about
 one quarter of the adults over 20 remained unmarried
 until death. If we have a series with a probably "normal"
 death distribution, including about 100 individuals, with
 an average life expectancy of about 20 years for the
 newborn, and the cultural remains indicate a time span
 of about 100 years for the use of the cemetery, the
 permanent population may be calculated as about 20
 persons, i.e., only a few families. In fact, the approximative
 calculation of cemetery use even with relatively large series
 of human remains indicates only a limited number for
 the permanent population, to the extent that the remains
 represent, as indicated by burial customs, not just a section
 of that population (see R6hrer-Ertl 1975 for discussion
 of this problem).
 In any case, we have to consider that the regulation
 of population processes and numbers depended upon a
 complex interaction of demographically relevant factors,
 and that the tempo of increase of local, regional, and world
 population was probably for the most part, including the
 so-called Neolithic and urban revolution, remarkably slow.
 The time permitted for reproduction was limited by an
 average adult death apex of about 37-38 years, and the
 generally high death rate until the 20th year skimmed
 off up to 60% of all newborns before reproduction. Thus
 the possible remaining surplus of the birth rate remained
 in the long run relatively small.
 In this connection, a few words on "migration": Charac-
 teristic of hominids, and especially H. sapiens sapiens, is
 a great capacity for learning. Thus a migration of cultures
 or languages never automatically indicates a comparable
 migration of individuals. We must therefore carefully
 Vol. 16 No. 2 June 1975 239
This content downloaded from 142.132.4.169 on Tue, 20 Feb 2018 22:48:09 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
 distinguish between the historically comprehensible effect
 of a "migration" and the real number of migrants. There
 are many indications that the long-term stability and bio-
 logical continuity of population sequences is relatively great.
 This accords very well with our other paleodemographic
 observations and working hypotheses. For further discus-
 sion, see Kurth (1965, 1972, 1975), Kurth and Weber-Olde-
 cap (1972), Maier (1972), and M6nkemeyer (1966).
 by CHRISTOPHER MEIKLEJOHN
 University of Winnipeg, Winnipeg, Manitoba, Canada R3B
 2E9. 18 xi 74
 Petersen's article is timely and should be read by anyone
 contemplating work in the area of prehistoric demography.
 As one already involved in such work (Meiklejohn 1974a,
 b), however, I am surprised at how little of it is new to
 me. It reads more like a description of the type of work
 currently being undertaken than a plea for new approaches.
 This is especially true in the area of hunter-gatherer studies
 (for example, Williams 1974).
 Many of the criticisms raised by Petersen refer to older
 approaches. This is highlighted by many of the references
 used. Few of us today would consider Vallois in the
 mainstream of work on mortality. His papers are classics.
 To a certain degree Petersen can be accused of shooting
 down straw dogs.
 In other cases it is possible to query generalizations. Can
 style and function never be related? Flannery (1972) has
 argued cogently for correlations between house structure,
 population site density, and mobility. In the interpretation
 of disease, Neel (1971) has provided models for certain
 population types in certain environments. Does the shift
 to sedentary life improve diet and health? I think that
 this remains to be proven.
 Finally, I would like to query what I consider slightly
 misleading allusions to accuracy in studies of skeletal age
 and sex. The reported figures by Petersen seem to refer
 to older work. With a reasonably well preserved sample,
 estimates of age and sex will be at the upper end of Petersen's
 range of accuracy. This is especially true if newer methods,
 such as those proposed by Acsadi and Nemeskeri (1970),
 are used.
 by YOSHIO ONUKI
 The Little World Foundation Museum of Man, 1-223
 Sasashima-cho, Nakamura-ku, Nagoya, Japan. 12 xii 74
 One of the major concerns in prehistoric or archeological
 studies is culture process, and not a few daring studies
 have been appearing in recent years. Since culture process
 is closely related to the development of the social system,
 archeological studies of culture process cannot but be
 involved in demography. Petersen's paper is a very timely
 warning. His caution as to ethnographic analogy and his
 criticism of the idea of population-resources balance deserve
 attention. I fully agree with Petersen when he says that
 archeological data are too poor for population estimates.
 Thus it seems that, at the present stage of knowledge and
 methodology, we cannot estimate population size for any
 category of prehistoric time. I wish Petersen could have
 suggested what archeologists should do or what demogra-
 phers can do with archeologists.
 Archeologists perhaps do not need such exact population
 figures as demographers expect from the accurate modern
 census. There must be other ways to consider population
 as a factor in culture process; one example may be Sanders
 and Price's (1968) Mesoamerica: The Evolution of a Civiliza-
 tion. I should like to know Petersen's opinion of this book,
 especially the part in which population is treated as a factor
 in culture evolution.
 by KENNETH M. WEISS
 Center for Demographic and Population Genetics, University
 of Texas Health Science Center at Houston, Houston, Tex.
 77025, U.S.A. 24 x 74
 This paper is a typical review of one field by a member
 of another. Many good, fundamental points are raised,
 but a great deal of needless confusion comes from the
 author's fixation upon the basic traditions and concepts
 of his own field along with an inevitably spotty knowledge
 of the literature of the other. If we use those traditional
 concepts to our own ends, or in ways deviating from his
 conventions, we are accused of error. This is regrettable,
 for it only causes wasteful argument. Unfortunately, I am
 subjected by Petersen to a condescending attack of this
 kind.
 My monograph (1973) is accused of having cumbrous
 notation; this is perhaps true, although the notation is
 consistent, correct, and hence perfectly valid (typos and,
 yes, occasional carelessness excluded). I am accused of
 "technical pretentiousness"; since no constructive comments
 are given, this must be due to the "ignorance of fundamen-
 tals" Peterson "documents" in n. 2. My definitions for crude
 death rate, age-specific birth rate, and net reproduction
 are all clear, mathematically correct, and either standard
 definitions found in many demography works (if Keyfitz, Coale,
 and Lotka, for example, are demographers) or equivalent
 alternative expressions. The characterization of the theoretical
 population as infinite is but one way of conceptualizing
 a continuous mathematical model (i.e., what is the meaning
 of a continuous age distribution, c (a), in a finite popula-
 tion?). My treatment of migration is mathematically proper
 and more relevant to anthropology than the standard
 sociology-based version (our populations have no "country's
 borders," but do practice reciprocal exchange). In my use
 of the term "growth regulation" I choose to include non-
 conscious factors and explain this in both sources Petersen
 cites. There is no substance to any of these criticisms.
 Petersen is totally wrong in two accusations: (1) My
 "average family size" is correct as defined ("menarche"
 included) and of specific use to anthropologists; I use
 "completed family size" as well, correctly defined in the
 same work. Being unfamiliar with my term, he assumes
 I am ignorantly misusing one of his. (2) My index of growth
 regulation is not merely Lotka's 50-year-old intrinsic growth
 rate, as Petersen asserts, but a comparison of an observed
 stable rate with rates which are intrinsic to certain other
 hypothetical vital-rate schedules.
 If Petersen.does not like an anthropologist's work, let
 him criticize it in a constructive way, thus allowing a reply
 in kind. In fact, he offers few positive points or suggestions
 to lead us poor sheep from the forest. He is correct to
 point out that we overanalyze data, use methods which
 are too crude, and overlook some relevant work of real,
 licensed demographers. But has he any productive ideas
 for our kind of data? Or must prehistoric demographers
 merely wait patiently until our populations develop writing
 and grow large enough so that we can turn their analysis
 over to the census bureau, who will do it right?
 by PAUL F. WILKINSON
 Department of Anthropology, University of Otago, Box 56,
 Dunedin, New Zealand. 27 x 74
 Petersen's paper exhibits some of the shortcomings that
 he attributes to Weiss's excursions from anthropology into
 demography and that perhaps inevitably characterize inter-
 disciplinary studies.
 The paper's strengths are its clear exposition of some
 elementary aspects of demography, with which prehis-
 torians and ethnographers may be unfamiliar, its identifica-
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 tion of the shortcomings of archaeological data for de-
 mographic investigations, and the caution that it urges in
 using ethnographic analogies.
 Its principal failing is, I think, that it does not show
 convincingly "the way to proceed." Given the inadequacy
 of archaeological data and the hazards of extrapolating
 from ethnographic studies, I cannot see how acquiring
 "the quite modest technical expertise on which demographic
 analysis is based" would materially assist palaeodemogra-
 phers, although ethnographic studies would certainly bene-
 fit from a more rigorous approach. Petersen may be correct
 that demographic studies of early man have "gotten off
 to a wrong start by not asking the right questions," but
 I did not feel much surer at the end of his paper what
 the right questions were or how they ought to be ap-
 proached.
 One danger of interdisciplinary studies is that "alien"
 experts-in this case the demographer-show only a partial
 awareness of the present state of the discipline into which
 they venture. For example, to exhort prehistorians to
 acknowledge "the existence of a full spiritual life in the
 peoples they study" seems to me a superfluous call to a
 discipline that has been so obsessed with man's "spirituality"
 that it has all but forgotten that he is an animal. Nor
 can I agree that "ethnographic analogy has ordinarily been
 understood narrowly, as the inference from certain specific
 similarities in artifacts to similarities in the material culture"
 (emphasis added). The discussion of ethnographic analogies
 underestimates the scrutiny to which they have been sub-
 jected, most recently by Binford (1967, 1968b, 1972). To
 argue that "the best guard against inappropriate parallels
 is the fully conscious acceptance of appropriate ones" merely
 begs the question of judging appropriateness. Finally, the
 unsubstantiated assertion that "for ancient man, migration
 was not an occasional aberration from a settled life, but
 the norm" invites disagreement on account of its failure
 to define "migration" (are we concerned, for example, with
 recurrent seasonal movements within a prescribed area to
 permit the exploitation of unevenly distributed resources,
 or with unidirectional, purposive, large-scale movements?)
 and because it shows no awareness that this is a lively,
 current issue among prehistorians (see, for example, J.
 G. D. Clark 1966 and Adams 1968 on the special case
 of "invasions").
 Two minor points: (1) J. Desmond Clark's (1962:1)
 comments are taken out of context and slightly misquoted,
 which, I think, distorts his viewpoint. (2) Debate will
 undoubtedly continue over the degree to which Childe's
 views were "dictated by a rather simple-minded Marxism,"
 but it is worth noting that, in the book cited by Petersen,
 Childe (1963:39) criticized the Russian classification of
 social evolution because it "assumes in advance precisely
 what archaeological facts have to prove."
 In summary, Petersen's criticisms are useful and
 worthwhile as far as they go, but I feel he underestimates
 the progress that archaeology has made, and I regret that
 he did not devote more time to suggesting more appropriate
 techniques and hypotheses to replace those that he demol-
 ishes so ably.
 Reply
 by WILLIAM PETERSEN
 Department of Sociology, Ohio State University, Columbus,
 Ohio 43210, U.S.A. 8 I 75
 As one with no pretense to professional competence in
 anthropology, archeology, or related disciplines, I offered
 Petersen: PREHISTORIC DEMOGRAHY
 a critical review of one of their subfields with a certain
 trepidation. I am gratified that it has excited rather little
 adverse rebuttal and at least some approbation. The two
 most general criticisms of my paper in a sense cancel each
 other: that I failed to include in my review the improved
 techniques allegedly being used in some recent work, and
 that I did not round out the exposition with specific
 recommendations for improvements.
 I was not under the impression that, among the books
 and papers I read, there was a steady improvement over
 time. My opinion of the several monographs by Cook and
 Borah, for example, is not as high as Dobyns's. Indeed,
 on the contrary, they typify the all too common indifference
 to demographic expertise: the authors use nonprofessional
 techniques to generate from dubious data conclusions that
 they seemingly find attractive just because of the presumed
 disasters. The implications of Cook's earlier paper (1946)
 on the population losses from pre-Columbian wars and
 human sacrifices were not so much balanced against this
 later view as abandoned. Why is it that sinologists, as
 Eberhard points out, generally hold that China's earlier
 non-Chinese populations disappeared mainly into a racial
 mixture, while analysts of such a country as Mexico, of
 which almost the whole non-Indian population is mestizo,
 usually take no account of this factor?
 As another example, I know of no overall work on the
 population of classical antiquity that matches the breadth
 and insight of Beloch's, which was published in 1886, and
 I am less willing to dismiss such men as Vallois or Kroeber
 than my critics seem to be. Much of what is now being
 published, in this field as in every other one, will not survive,
 but the works that we now term classics have already been
 culled. That is not to deny, of course, that some recently
 published papers (including a few of those I cited) represent
 genuine methodological advances-though these have
 sometimes not penetrated even to others working on the
 same specific topics, not to say to the whole of the several
 disciplines. It would seem to be excessively sanguine to
 take such papers, even if one assumes that their promise
 will be realized, as a true measure of the current state
 of the art.
 What is to be done? several commentators ask. I suggest
 again, as does Kennedy, that those who want to analyze
 population trends take the trouble to learn at least the
 elements of demography. Weiss is inclined to be defensive
 about every detail of his published record, and rather than
 go through the same litany of errors, let me suggest a
 parallel. Suppose that I as a demographer became interested
 in analyzing the relation between kin structure and fertility
 and, in pursuing this new interest, dipped into the large
 body of writings on social anthropology and eventually
 published a monograph in which household and family were
 confused, as well as exogamy and hypergamy, and in which
 the already complex notation that has become conventional
 for illustrating a kin structure was introduced to my fellow
 demographers (totally ignorant of the field, in the main)
 with some new and pointless complications of my own.
 I do not think such a procedure would be useful, and
 I hope I would react sensibly to the suggestion that I was
 not in control of a discipline that, after all, was not yet
 my own.
 I had not read Sanders and Price (1968), and now that
 I have read it, following Onuki's recommendation, I agree
 that it is an interesting and competent work. Sanders, they
 write (p. 84), finds the estimates of population losses made
 by Borah and Cook "much too high and is preparing a
 full critique of their methodology and the underlying
 assumptions of their studies"; I shall look forward to reading
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 it. The comments that Sanders and Price make on the
 relation between population and social structure strike me
 as reasonable, and I find it especially commendable that
 they carefully construct typologies rather than generalizing
 to the whole of a culture "stage." Kurth's interesting
 comments, on the contrary, go from a valid point to what
 I find to be too broad a conclusion. The paper by Hajnal
 (1965) that I cited is a striking confirmation of Kurth's
 statement that in Europe the regulation of numbers was
 largely by shifts in the proportion married and in the age
 at marriage. I do not believe, however, that one can
 generalize from this one continent to the whole of mankind.
 In classical India and China, as prime examples, the
 "floating balance" was achieved far less by controls of
 marriage patterns than by what Malthus termed positive
 checks. I would hold, however, that Kurth is correct in
 one important sense: every culture of which we have the
 requisite knowledge includes norms or practices whose
 effect (though not necessarily purpose) is antinatalist.
 As Eberhard points out, this is true even of traditional
 China, which American sociologists have typically denoted
 as the prototypical "familistic" society. The policy implica-
 tions of his account are staggering: one can anticipate that
 modernization will erode the kinds of superstitions he
 describes and thus, in this instance, increase by three times
 the number of opportunities for conception. Efforts to
 establish family-planning programs in such countries are
 usually based on the contrary assumption, that moderniza-
 tion is wholly and unambiguously antinatalist in its effects.
 Not surprisingly, most of the programs have failed.
 Childe did indeed make the comment on Russian ar-
 cheologists that Wilkinson quotes, but I find its import
 quite different. Of the 20th century's two monstrous tyrants,
 Stalin went far beyond Hitler in his personal control of
 the whole range of learning, from astronomy to zoology.
 Except in a work on the history of ethnology, an anthro-
 pologist would have to be in a Stalinist straitjacket still
 to discuss seriously the theories of Morgan, not to say Engels.
 Judging from Childe's quotations from their works, some
 of the Russians seemed to be groping for a safe iota of
 independent judgment, and Childe compounded his defer-
 ence to Stalin's scholarship by voicing disagreement with
 this mild dissent. My main point, however, was not Childe's
 politics, but rather that all too many who do not share
 his ideology have accepted the archeological framework
 partly derivative from it.
 I am sorry that Dobyns chose to interpret my comments
 personally. The point I was making was quite general.
 Most in the United States who teach the social sciences,
 as well as many in all faculties of the most prestigious
 universities, are well to the left of the normal range of
 American politics (Lipset 1972, Lipset and Dobson 1972).
 In anthropology, I believe, this prevalent tendency was
 aggravated by a nonsensical interpretation of cultural rel-
 ativism. In order adequately to study a band of naked
 savages, one must try to see the world with their eyes,
 accepting as a working postulate that this culture and all
 other cultures are on a par; in other words, one starts,
 as in much other scientific investigation, with a premise
 of as-if, in Vaihinger's phrase. But to accept the postulate
 as "a guide to the evaluation of value systems, especially
 ethics, politics, and esthetics, and [thus] an attitude toward
 practical problems of sociocultural reform and change"
 (Bidney 1968), strikes me as bad science, if only because
 it is almost certain to be dishonest. In his main works,
 Malinowski promulgated cultural egalitarianism as vig-
 orously as anyone could and then showed, in two posthu-
 mous works, how completely alien this stance was to his
 actual thinking. The first of these books was an impassioned
 diatribe against Nazism (1944), which I would hold-just
 because it was a vile and dangerous enemy-it was especially
 necessary to analyze coolly, trying to understand it "as if"
 one were a Nazi in order to see what attracted Germans
 to the cause. The second work, a diary that Malinowski
 kept in the Trobriands (1967), was published after his death
 by his widow. While in his public works Malinowski always
 put the hateful word "savage" in quotation marks, in this
 journal he was jotting down his "general aversion for
 niggers," his wish that he could beat up informants "without
 starting a row," his feeling that he would like to "exterminate
 the brutes." I wonder how different Malinowski was from
 all the other cultural egalitarians, except of course in the
 unfortunate publication of his private views. I wish that
 Dobyns, since he chose to comment on it at all, had discussed
 the issue in this broader context.
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